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Evaluating Ethiopia’s Development Progress
Abstract
Ethiopia, Africa’s second most-populated nation is well on its way to becoming one of its wealthiest
nations as it charges forward on its path to development. The big question is whether this growth is
sustainable. To tackle this question, we will discuss its development strategy using a popular comparison
to that of China. We will then offer an appraisal of the current state of the country. Finally, we will evaluate
the future of Ethiopia, as it continues its current path – evaluating the potential upsides and risks it faces
moving forward.
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EVALUATING ETHIOPIA’S DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS

1. INTRODUCTION: ETHIOPIA, THE LAST FRONTIER?
‘We are the only African country that has never been colonized. This is perhaps the last
surviving African civilization’ (Meles, 2007). Besides being commonly known as the only
African country to never have been colonized, Ethiopia is also often regarded as ‘the birthplace
of humanity’. Ethiopia is one of the most prominent African success stories in recent years. A
country that is often associated with dire poverty and devastating famines has experienced
sustained economic growth for the last 20 years, thereby alleviating the misery of millions of
its own people, and now viewing itself in a prime position to become the last development
frontier. Ethiopia was ruled by Emperor Haile Selassie until 1974, when he was toppled and
replaced by the Derg, a military junta that imposed a USSR-style command economy, coupled
with totalitarian rules. The Derg period was marked by very limited economic growth and
repeated famines, most notably from 1983 to 1985, where it is estimated that around half a
million people succumbed to starvation. At the same time, the Derg brutally suppressed
political dissidents as well as the Eritrean independence movement. Since the very beginning
of Derg rule, several Marxist groups rebelled against the new regime by taking up arms and
engaging in guerilla warfare. Additionally, Addis Ababa was faced with an invasion by
neighbouring Somalia, where irredentists sought to annex parts of Eastern Ethiopia that were
inhabited primarily by ethnic Somalis. Only in 1991 was the oppressive Derg regime finally
pushed out of power by a coalition of rebel groups, known as the Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Democratic Front. This marked the beginning of Ethiopia’s economic
transformation, which this paper will focus on. In the first section, we will discuss Ethiopia’s
development strategy, and analyze the degree to which it is based on the Chinese model. In the
second part, we will then offer an appraisal of the current state of the country, and evaluate the
progress that has been made so far. Finally, there will be a discussion of the future path of
development in Ethiopia, where we will examine the potential upsides and risks that the
country faces.

2. ETHIOPIA: DEVELOPMENT WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS?
No country has more often been invoked as an analogy for Ethiopia in recent years than
China, and not without reason (Capital Moments, 2017). If Rwanda is Africa’s Singapore, then
Ethiopia is its China. The similarities are manifold. A strikingly poor country with an ancient
civilization emerges from famine and internal turmoil, averaging double-digit growth rates for
more than a decade while rejecting Western economic orthodoxy as well as political
liberalization. Both countries are ruled by a single party and have opted for a state-led
development (McKinnon, 2010). In this section, we will take look at Ethiopia’s development
model, with a special focus on its contentious industrial policy. We will discuss the potential
virtues and shortcomings of this model as well as its intellectual underpinnings. Subsequently,
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we will compare this to the development policies introduced by China and point to some
essential differences between the two.
2.1 ETHIOPIA’S INDUSTRIAL POLICY

Generally associated more with perennial famines than stellar economic performance,
Ethiopia has gone through an economic boom over the last decade. From 2005 to 2015, real
GDP growth averaged almost 11% according to official government figures, transforming
Ethiopia into the largest economy in Eastern Africa (CNBC Africa, 2016). Aided by significant
foreign investment, the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF),
commonly known as Ehadig, has embarked on an itinerary of concerted structural economic
change. After having ousted the military Derg regime that had been in power since 1974,
Ehadig started consolidating power while also implementing reforms to lay the groundwork for
increased economic growth (Oqubay, 2015). Contrary to what orthodox development
economics would recommend, Addis Ababa consciously rejected liberalization and a
diminished role for the state. Most importantly, it executed an activist industrial policy. The
term industrial policy can be interpreted rather broadly. Here, we will use the definition
provided by Arkebe Oqubay, former mayor of Addis Ababa and senior policy maker in the
Ethiopian government, whereby industrial policy denotes ‘[…] a strategy that includes a range
of implicit or explicit policy instruments selectively focused on specific industrial sectors for
the purpose of shaping structural change in line with a broader national vision and strategy’
(Oqubay, 2015, p.18). The mechanisms associated with such a design range from market
control, strategic subsidization, protective tariffs, targeted quotas and ‘picking winners’, to the
installation special economic zones and the protection of foreign investors (Stiglitz, 2014). In
Ethiopia’s case, industrial policy has focused on agricultural development-led industrialization
(ADLI), conducted through the implementation of five-year plans. The government plans to
increase employment in the more productive sectors of the economy by promoting industrial
development. At the same time, it aims to provide a more conducive environment for private
actors by investing in public infrastructure projects, facilitating access to credit and
maintaining macroeconomic stability, while also pursuing rather unorthodox measures in order
to finance public investment. Addis Ababa also explicitly subscribes to the rationale of the
infant industry argument (Oqubay, 2015). In essence, it aims to utilize tariff barriers to protect
nascent industries until they have reached sufficient economies of scale, enabling them to
compete with foreign companies (Sauré, 2007).

2.2 BREAKING WITH THE PARADIGM
These heterodox economic policies have not always found favor with Western observers
and international institutions such as the IMF or the World Bank, which have generally
endorsed the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ [1]. This package of policy prescriptions,
which emerged in the 1980s and was being championed not only by the above-mentioned
institutions but also by the US government, as well as advocates for market-based reforms,
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financial liberalization, and cautions against state-led intervention. This is based on the belief
that excessive government interference will lead to economic distortions with negative effects
on resource allocation, exacerbated rent-seeking and generally sub-optimal economic outcomes
(McKinnon, 2010). Additionally, undue government activity can often lead to the crowdingout of the private sector. In Ethiopia’s case, this is specifically worrisome as it pertains to the
access to credit and other refinancing options, both of which are heavily dominated by the state
(World Bank, 2016).
2.3 NEOPATRIMONIALISM AS AN IMPEDIMENT?

Another criticism leveled at African activist industrial policy stems from those who
underline the pervasiveness of ‘neopatrimonialism’ in the societies of sub-Saharan Africa
(Erdmann 2006). Neopatrimonialism denotes a system of social hierarchy that, while often coexisting with legal-rational bureaucracies, is essentially based on patrimonial-clientage
relationships, where loyalty hinges on the redistribution of favors and material incentives by
those in power to the clientele (Van de Walle, 1999; Orogun, 1991). This essentially implies
that the many failures of industrial policy in Africa were essentially of political rather than
economic nature, signifying the state’s lack of fundamental capabilities and/or will to
implement sound policies. Institutional weakness and rampant and endemic corruption, both of
which are prevalent in African societies, supposedly exacerbate rent-seeking and inefficiencies,
whereby the ruler’s personal clientele or favored ethnic/religious group benefit excessively
from government intervention in the economy (Oqubay, 2015).
Ethiopian policymakers openly reject these admonitions, as well as free trade and economic
liberalism. One foreign observer recalls how he was told in Addis Ababa that Ethiopia would
‘prefer to be dragged over burning coals’ over turning towards the IMF for assistance
(Robertson, 2016). This repudiation of the ‘Washington Consensus’ is a very conscious
decision, and Ethiopian officials have repeatedly praised China’s development path as a role
model, which suggests acceptance of a however vaguely defined ‘Beijing Consensus’. In line
with the supposed ‘China model’, many Asian observers point to the advantages of Ethiopia’s
political stability and its ability to eschew cumbersome political compromises when it comes to
implementing economic reforms (Oqubay, 2015).
2.4 NO MERE COPY: PRAGMATISM PREVAILS?
Nonetheless, despite all the similarities between Ethiopia’s development strategy and that of
China or the East Asian Tigers, there are also crucial differences. Agriculture plays a more
prominent role in the Ethiopian economy in comparison to the minor part of manufacturing,
which only accounts for a minor part of the Ethiopian economy with an employment share of
around 10% (World Bank, 2016). Furthermore, Ethiopia has significantly lower domestic
saving rates than the Tigers or China had at similar stages of development, which makes
investment financing more challenging. Particularly in contrast to the Chinese Renminbi, the
Ethiopian Birr has been kept at artificially high levels in order to facilitate capital imports.
Officials in Addis Ababa have pointed out that currency depreciation would not serve their
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immediate policy goals, especially as export-oriented manufacturing is still in its infant stages
(World Bank).
In this section, we have examined the Ethiopian development model from a theoretical
perspective. It is based on an activist industrial policy, executed through specific and wideranging governmental interventions in the economy and fueled by massive public investment.
Ethiopian policy makers are conscious of the need for structural change in order to facilitate
sustainable economic growth. Furthermore, we have demonstrated the rejection of orthodox
advice concerning the liberalization of the economy, in favor what has been termed the
‘Beijing Consensus’ on development. Nevertheless, the Ethiopian growth model is not simply
an imitation of the Chinese experience, as Addis Ababa has pragmatically opted to utilize only
those aspects that are suitable to Ethiopia’s specific conditions.

3. THE CURRENT STATE OF ETHIOPIA’S DEVELOPMENT
Ethiopia has, over the years, undergone massive development following the introduction of
their precise plans. The gravity of this progression is visible according to several development
indicators. These include financial, health, education, and specific sectoral indicators.
3.1 ETHIOPIA’S FINANCIAL BOOM
GDP per capita, one of the most commonly used development indicators, measures
economic development according to the pace of income growth per head of the population
(United Nations, n.d.). According to its current trend in GDP per capita growth, Ethiopia is
positioned to be developing at a very successful rate. More specifically, there have been two
peak periods of growth during recent Ethiopian history – 1993-2004, when the growth rate was
4.5%, and 2004 -2014, when it soared to 10.9%. These figures are remarkable considering the
fact that during the bulk of the 1980s, the growth rate was at a measly 0.5% (see annex A1).
The year 1992 marked the shift from a command economy to a more market-oriented economy
associated with the demise of the socialist Derg regime (1974–1991). In addition, the period
since 1992 was preceded by political regime change and the end of a major civil war. Growth
was higher during this first period in the 90s, but somewhat unstable. 2004, in turn, marked the
first year of an unprecedented sustained high-growth period (World Bank, 2016). Both shifts
suggest very promising movements for the Ethiopian economy.
3.2 EDUCATION IN ETHIOPIA: A PRIORITY
As a primary component of its push towards becoming a middle-income country, education
has been placed as a point of focus by the Ethiopian government. In 1994, Ethiopia announced
the passing of the Education and Training Policy (ETP) reform, which was the first formal
framework for education in Ethiopia (International Development Center of Japan, 2012). Its
objectives were to provide a more comprehensive education for its students both in primary
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and secondary education, as wells as in terms of training (Ministry of Education, 1994). In
2010/11, the gross enrollment rate (GER) was 96.4% in primary education. The net enrollment
rate (NER) marked 85.3% in 2010/11, the highest ever and showing a significant improvement
from 52.2% in 2001/02 (see annex A2). However, Ethiopia’s focus has been not only on access
to education, but also on concurrent improvements in the quality of education together with the
increasing population growth- ensuring that more of their students pass and a more equal
system of education (UNESCO, 2015). As it currently stands, compared to other countries,
Ethiopia ranks at the 7th percentiles in access to education and at the 8th percentiles in learning
outcomes (EPDC, 2014) (see annex A3). However, its increased per pupil expenditure rate
suggests that Ethiopia will make a big leap in the educational sector (see annex A4).
3.3 DERIVING DEVELOPMENT FROM HEALTH
In order to have a progressive economy, one must have a stable healthy population. It is
therefore imperative that Ethiopia show improvements in the health sector to ever be
considered as successfully developing. As it stands, Ethiopia is characterized by a
predominantly rural and impoverished population with limited access to safe water, housing,
sanitation, food and health care. Estimated life expectancy at birth is 63 years for males and 67
years for females (World Bank, 2016). The burden of disease measured in terms of premature
death is estimated at 350 disability-adjusted life years lost per 1000 members of the population,
which is the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to the widespread poverty and lowincome level of the population, a low literacy rate (mainly among women) and lack of access
to health care have contributed to ill health in the country. The infant mortality rate is 41 deaths
per 1000 live births, while the overall under-five mortality rate is 58.4 per 1000 live births (see
Annex A5_1 and A5_2). A total of 67% of all deaths of children aged under five years in
Ethiopia take place before a child’s first birthday. However, these levels are considerably lower
than those reported in the Ethiopian demographic and health survey in 2005. Both the infant
mortality rate and the under-five mortality rate have decreased significantly (World Health
Organization, 2014). Ethiopia remains one of the poorest in terms of health conditions, but its
improvements show promise of development.
3.4 SECTORAL DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA
Development is also capable of being felt directly in specific sectors. In Ethiopia, most
notably, the Services and Agricultural Sector have been the most promising. The Services
sector was the largest in terms of economic output, accounting for 45% of the value added in
the Ethiopian Economy in 2013 (see Annex A6). It has also been one of the largest sectors in
terms of employment, accounting for the employment of 15% of the total population of
Ethiopia in 2013(see Annex A7). The global pattern has changed over time as services are now
creating more jobs and manufacturing less, a sign of premature deindustrialization. Ethiopia is
consistent with this trend apart from manufacturing output, which remained quite small
unfortunately. The agricultural sector is the second biggest in terms of economic output and by
far the biggest employer, with the number of farmers growing at a rate of 3.4% (World Bank,
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2016). With continuous expansion in terms of cultivated area (land) and farmers (labor), one
could make the argument that the agricultural sector should be the focus of development policy
in Ethiopia.

4. CONTINUOUS GROWTH?
ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL AND RISKS OF AN EMERGING ECONOMY
Expectations are high for Ethiopia to follow the footsteps of the Asian tigers, which is to
guarantee continuous economic growth by building an increasingly important manufacturing
sector. The economic successes of previous years seem to proof support country’s potential to
reach this goal in the coming decades, yet there are certain risks that have the potential to
undermine this success story. The following sections analyse the future expectations and risks
for the Ethiopian economy.
4.1 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE - POSSIBILITIES FOR
CONTINUOUS GROWTH
Continuous industrialization is one of the cornerstones for the future economic success of
Ethiopia. Building on manufacturing as a driver for growth, Ethiopia has increasingly attracted
investors for its manufacturing facilities. These investors recognize Ethiopia as a prime
investment destination not solely based on its encouraging expected growth rates, but due to
other positive factors as well such as low production costs and stability (Aglionby, 2017). First,
the costs for energy and labor in Ethiopia are multiple times lower than in the manufacturing
economies in Asia, and therefore this gives the Ethiopian market a comparative advantage in
the producing industrial sector for the foreseeable future. Second, as compared to other African
countries that would boast a similar economic structure and would - in terms of low cost - be
attractive to foreign investors, Ethiopia is a politically stable country. For the last two decades,
there have been no major regime changes, and this stability is reflected in the increasing
attractiveness of Ethiopia for foreign investors. If these conditions - low production costs
relative to other manufacturing nations and political stability - can be upheld, capital inflow
into, and thus the development of, the Ethiopian manufacturing sector is likely to continue.
Next to its preferential situation as a low cost producing country, Ethiopia has other
strengths that can be further exploited in the future. Being the second largest country in terms
of population on the African continent, Ethiopia has great potential as a market and thus
expansion of international firms into the Ethiopian market is highly likely. To exploit this
potential, however, Ethiopia must further expand its effort to effect structural change. There
are many fields open to further development as a substantial part of Ethiopia’s work force that
is still employed in the small structured agricultural sector (World Bank, 2016, p. 39). As
McMillan and Rodrik (2011) put it, “[a]s labor and other resources move from agriculture into
modern economic activities, overall productivity rises and incomes expand. The speed with
which this structural transformation takes place is the key factor that differentiates successful
countries from unsuccessful ones” (p. 1). Thus, focusing on the modernization and
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commercialization of the agricultural sector and restructuring the economy as a whole - a shift
from primary to the secondary and tertiary sector - offers great potential for further economic
development.
4.2 FROM CLIMATE CHANGE TO POLITICAL INSTABILITY - RISKS FOR ETHIOPIA’S GROWING
ECONOMY
Yet, while structural change opens up doors for future development, if such a
transformation is not effectuated in a timely manner, there are major risks for Ethiopia’s
economy. Moreover, besides structural change, Ethiopia runs the risk to be overtaken by
technological development in other parts of the world, rendering its growth strategy obsolete.
An economy strongly based on agriculture remains vulnerable to commodity price volatility as
well as ecological degradation. Through this dependency on agricultural production,
exogenous factors such as lack of rainfall and price volatility have significant effects on the
purchasing power of Ethiopian households and therefore on the growth potential of the
economy itself (Hill and Porter, 2016). This problematic situation is further exacerbated by the
risks of climate change, as Yalew et al. (2017) concluded, “the regional effects of climate
change primarily depend on the share of agriculture in the regions’ (sic!) GDP” (p. 21). While
this evidence shows the risk of not achieving timely structural change, even if such change is
effectuated, a simple shift from agricultural to manufacturing might not get the job of sustained
economic development done. The reason for such a risk is increasing automation. Ethiopia
might simply be too late when copying the strategy of the Asian tigers to shift its focus to
manufacturing, as technology currently takes large leaps to replace workers, for example, in
the clothing production sector. As wages are rising in the production sectors of East-Asian
countries, other economies – such as Ethiopia – which aim to fill the void might be overtaken
by robots (Nicolaou and Stacey, 2017).
As mentioned above, Ethiopia’s popularity with foreign investors can be in part explained
by its relative political stability as compared to other low-cost African countries. Such a
continuous stability must be maintained to secure sustained economic growth. In turn, an
unstable political situation threatens continued economic success in Ethiopia. During eleven
months of upheaval in the Oromia region, the government introduced a state of emergency in
order to crack down on the protest in October 2016. These upheavals were spurred by political
and economic grievances, as the country is controlled by one single party and the economic
growth does not arrive in all regions equally. Little is done by the government to address these
issues and thereby treat the disease; instead, it is just suppressing the symptoms by employing
coercive force (Aglionby, 2017). Besides internal political challenges, instability in Ethiopia’s
neighbourhood can impede sustained growth. With neighboring countries that are politically
unstable, to say the least, such as Somalia and South Sudan, as well as continued political
tensions with Eritrea, Ethiopia has to watch out and anticipate cross border challenges before
they arrive to secure a stable environment for investment (Coface, 2017). In short, Ethiopia
faces political risks that could undermine its attractiveness to foreign investors in the future,
and these risks are equally to be found within the borders of the country, as well as in the
general instability of the region.
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All in all, Ethiopia possesses strengths that indicate a continuation of its success story and
the possibility to strengthen its status as emerging country in East Africa. Growing interest of
foreign investors, low production costs – and thus comparative advantage – as well as the
structural potential for economic growth, underpin this possibility. Yet, there are a number of
economic and political risks that might undermine such a development. Ecological
degradation, climate change, and commodity price volatility can seriously harm the economy
that is still to a large degree based on agricultural production. Moreover, copying the
development model of the “Asian Tigers” – thus focusing on manufacturing – could prove as
becoming obsolete as automation in the manufacturing sector plays an increasingly important
role. Internal and external political questions are yet other factors that will co-determine the
success or failure of the Ethiopian way. In short, Ethiopia shows potential to achieve perpetual
economic success, yet it will have to overcome a number of obstacles on the path.

5. CONCLUSION
Ethiopia has had the highest rate of economic growth of any large African country over the
last decade, resulting in large-scale poverty reduction and renewed dynamism. It has
implemented a state-led development model that broadly builds upon the example set by
China, but from which it also differs in several crucial regards. More generally, Ethiopian
policymakers have largely rejected orthodox development models in favour of an activist
industrial policy and heterodox financing arrangements. The success of this development
model seems staggering at first sight, as advances have been made not only in purely financial
term but also across the board in human development more broadly. This is clearly indicated
by the growing number of children who receive basic education, as well as by the remarkable
improvements witnessed in the health sector. Developments such as growing popularity with
foreign investors and comparative advantage in manufacturing due to low production costs
suggest that the success story of the last years and decades can continue well into the future.
On the other hand, Ethiopia’s development also faces significant obstacles and potential risks
that should not be underestimated, and which include not only natural degradation and price
volatility, but also political instability.
To put this discussion into perspective, though, it must not be forgotten that the starting
point for development in Ethiopia remains strikingly low. Being a country with nearly 100
million inhabitants, its total GDP is only equal to that of the city of Zurich, which has a
population of little more than 400’000 inhabitants. Even more illustrative is a comparison with
China, which is often regarded as Ethiopia’s ‘development role model’. Some 30 years ago, the
level of development in the two countries was roughly the same, yet today the GDP per capita
in Ethiopia is only a little more than a tenth of that in China (IMF, 2017). Thus, the path to
catching up is a long one. Notwithstanding all the anticipated difficulties, Ethiopia’s success
over the last years is remarkable, and if it continues to hold up its run, ‘emerging country’ is a
term that can be assigned to the economy. On a final note, seeing Ethiopia’s growth during the
last decade, a legitimate question can be asked whether other African countries can and should
follow its footsteps and adopt its specific development model. This question opens up to a
broader topic of study to the extent to which such heterodox economic policy can prove useful
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in an African-wide context, and whether the current paradigms of economic development
should be revisited.
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ANNEX

ANNEX A1: ETHIOPIA: REAL GDP GROWTH

Source: World Bank (2016), Used with permission

ANNEX
A2: P
RIMARY GROSS AND NET ENROLLMENT RATES (2001/02 -2010/11) (%)
Table
4-4:
Primary Gross and Net Enrollment Rates (2001/02 - 2010/11) (%)
2001/ 2002/ 2003/ 2004/ 2005/ 2006/ 2007/ 2008/ 2009/
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
GER Primary Boys 96.2
94.6
95.2 109.8 123.9 122.9 133.0 126.7 123.2
Grades Girls 73.3
73.5
78.3
95.5 111.2 111.2 122.5 118.4 114.3
1-4
Total
84.9
84.2
86.9 102.7 117.6 117.1 127.8 122.6 118.8
52.5
57.0
62.0
67.4
68.3
64.8
65.6
67.4
Primary Boys 45.4
Grades Girls 27.4
31.9
36.9
42.6
49.8
53.7
55.5
60.5
63.5
5-8
Total
36.5
42.4
47.1
52.5
58.8
61.1
60.2
63.1
65.5
74.6
77.4
88.0
98.6
98.0 100.5 97.6
96.6
Primary Boys 71.7
Grades Girls 51.2
53.8
59.1
71.5
83.9
85.1
90.5
90.7
90.1
1-8
Total
61.6
64.4
68.4
79.8
91.3
91.7
95.6
94.4
93.4
NER Primary Boys 59.0
60.6
62.9
73.2
81.7
82.6
86.0
84.6
83.7
Grades Girls 45.2
47.2
51.8
63.6
73.2
75.5
80.7
81.3
80.5
1-8
Total
52.2
54.0
57.4
68.5
77.5
79.1
83.4
83.0
82.1
(Source: 2000/01-2004/05: MOE, 2005, 2005/06-2009/10: MOE, 2010c, 2010/11: MOE, 2011a)

2010/
11
128.8
119.1
124.0
67.4
64.8
66.1
99.5
93.2
96.4
87.0
83.5
85.3

Source:
Development
of Japan,
Inc. (2012).
4.1.4International
Enrollment
Trend ofCenter
Secondary
Education
As the target of the series of ESDPs has been set to achieve the UPE by 2015, policies and
financial investment focused preferentially on primary education. As a result, primary education
was significantly expanded (WB, 2008a). This has occurred also at the secondary level (WB,
2008a). However, gender disparities and disparities between urban and rural areas have become
a challenge, especially in the secondary level (Cambridge Education, Mokoro & OPM, 2010).
In addition, though the enrollment rate of general secondary education has improved
significantly, the enrollment of preparatory secondary education has still remained low (WB,
2008a).
As shown in Table 4-5, the GER of general secondary schools has increased during the past 10
years, and reached 38.4% in 2010/11. The GER of preparatory secondary has also increased.
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ANNEX
A3: COMPARISONOF
OF A
CCESS AND
LITERACY
FIG
8. COMPARISON
ACCESS
AND
LITERACY
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Source: Education Policy and Data Center (2014)

FIG 10. PERFORMANCE ON LEARNING ASSESSMENTS

100

ANNEX A4: PER PUPIL EXPENDITURE (PPE) BY SCHOOL LEVEL (% OF GDP PER CAPITA)
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50%
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Source: Education Policy and Data Center (2014)
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N0. of deaths per 1000 live births

ANNEX A5_1: INFANT MORTALITY RATE

Year

Source: Retrieved from https://datacatalog.worldbank.org
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N0. of deaths per 1000 live births

ANNEX A5_2: UNDER 5 MORTALITY RATE

Year
Year

Source: Retrieved from https://datacatalog.worldbank.org
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ANNEX A6: VALUE ADDED IN THE ETHIOPIAN ECONOMY

Source: World Bank (2016), Used with permission
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ANNEX A7: EMPLOYMENT IN ETHIOPIAN ECONOMY

Source: World Bank (2016), Used with permission
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